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Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or
masquerade as such. The reverse may be true, too: deep moral–political conflicts
may be waged through the manipulation of economic resources and the design
of policy devices. Using the recent financial and Eurozone crises as empirical back-
grounds, the short papers presented here by Philippe Steiner, Cornelia Woll, Wolf-
gang Streeck and Marion Fourcade propose four different perspectives on the play
of moral judgments in the economy and call for a broader and more systematic
scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on executive compensation, bank
bailouts and the sovereign debt crisis, the discussion forum builds on a roundtable
discussion held at the openingof the Max PlanckSciences Po CenteronCoping with
Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.
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The collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers on September 9, 2008
opened the black boxofmodern financialmarkets to theworld. It exposed finance’s
vast and complex machine, until then largely invisible to the wider public and
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poorly mastered by even its most skilled practitioners. With that, the technical
became political. Esoteric terms such as collateralized debt obligations, credit
default swaps, haircuts, yield spreads and write-downs were catapulted to public
fame. The obliviousness of regulatory institutions became a topic for dinner
conversations.
Thenew formsof scrutiny also exposedfinance as a social activity subject to con-
siderable dishonesty and recklessness. Expert reflections about executive pay, bank
rescues or sovereign debt default were laden with statements about good and bad
incentives,moral hazard and loopholes. The public respondedwith categorical dis-
tinctions between the ruthless and the clueless, the corrupt and the honest, the lazy
and the industrious, the profligate and the frugal, the greedy and the rest, what is
right andwhat is not. VindicatingMarx’s statement in the Economic and Philosoph-
ical Manuscripts of 1844 that ‘[political economy] is—for all its worldly and
debauched appearance—a truly moral science, the most moral science of all’
(2005, p. 361), such arguments continue to saturate specialist debates and political
negotiations about the most appropriate responses to the banking and sovereign
debt crises. Are financial executives really worthy of the outsized compensations
they have enjoyed so far, or do enormous bonuses offend common decency
(Steiner, 2012)? Is there a just interest rate and is it ethical to protect the right of cred-
itors to receive interest payments? Should some lending practices be described as
predatory, and made illegal? Is it morally acceptable to bail out imprudent financial
institutions using taxpayers’ money, when imprudent individual borrowers are left
struggling? People’s sense of justicemay be seriously hurt, as Swedberg (2013) points
out. Is it fair to protect the holdings of foreign creditors (e.g. German and French
banks, for the most part) while citizens suffer to repay? Does Greece deserve to be
saved, given its government’s lies about the true state of its national debt? Does the
fact that Cyprus is a money-laundering platform justify a harsher treatment of the
population that supported, implicitly or explicitly, the island’s conversion into a
fiscal paradise? Is it right that the EuropeanCentral Bank—an unelected body—dras-
tically varies its assistance to Italy depending on the government in power there?
Competing visions of fairness, moral tolerability, right and wrong courses of
action are written all over economic struggles. Ordinary attitudes about the
economy—for instance, about the ‘market’, or about poverty—mobilize socially
and historically situated conceptions of justice or human nature, sometimes expli-
citly couched in religious or political terms (Steensland, 2010; Steensland and
Schrank, 2011). To the extent that they are gendered beings with a distinctive
history, a social position, a nationality, social scientists are not immune from
these collective forces (Bourdieu, 1988).Notwithstanding the externality cherished
by experts, policy struggles (including what to investigate, and how; or the criteria
bywhich to evaluate policyoptions) always imply political choices—that is, choices
about the distribution of economic power in society. Thus some scholars (Lebaron,
2000; Nelson, 2001) have described economics, or its different intellectual currents
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(Keynesian, Chicagoan, Marxist, etc.), as belief systems. As AlanWolfe (1989, p. 6)
put it, ‘even those social sciences that pride themselves on rigorous value neutrality,
insisting that they are only describing how people do act, not advocating how they
should, contain implicit (and often explicit) statements of what people’s obliga-
tions to one another should be.’ But the point is not merely about the scholastic
biases of different disciplines. It is much broader. Economies are shaped by the
moral dispositions and beliefs of the individuals who govern them as much as
they are governed through techniques and numbers (Lascoumes and Le Gale`s,
2005). These dispositions, in turn, stem in part from a symbolic metamorphosis
of political and economic interests, both individual and collective.
The current financial and economic crisis in Western economies offers many
empirical sites for sharpening our theoretical frameworks in this direction. If this
short symposium offers a programmatic call to recognize the relevance of moral
judgments when analyzing economic processes, its more immediate objective is
to analyze different ways in which moral categories have been mobilized in the
financial and Eurozone crises. We begin at the micro-level, with individuals, and
scale up gradually, toward organizations, specific countries and interstate relations.
In the first piece, Philippe Steiner analyzes the reconfiguration of the ‘moral
economy’ surrounding income inequalities in light of repeated revelations of out-
landish executive pay in the French media and the consciousness-raising activities
of the so-called 99%.These events, Steiner suggests, haveprompted abetter graspof
the reality of income inequality (people continue to vastly underestimate the
income of a CEO, but less than they used to). But—and perhaps paradoxically,
given the public outrage over these issues—their tolerance for income inequality
has increased, too (in France, the desired inequality ratio between a worker’s
wage and a CEO’s has jumped from 6.3 in 1999 to 18 in 2010).
Next, CorneliaWoll’s analysis of bank bailouts underlines the dilemma between
the collective problem of systemic risk and the individual one of moral hazard.
None of the solutions adopted to face the crisis has been able to solve both problems
at once, she argues; to avoid systemic risk, governments have committed large
amounts of public money to save the culprits of the financial mess, increasing
the moral hazard problem. Woll argues that we need to enhance the collective
moral responsibility of the financial industry so that banks will be able to cooperate
among themselves and participate in their own rescue as a group.
In the subsequentpiece,WolfgangStreeckoffers apowerful indictmentof theEuro-
pean Commission and financial elites in his interpretation of the unfolding of the
Greek economic tragedy. European institutions actively encouraged the Greek credit
binge, Streeck argues, first on the supply side (by lowering fiscal transfers to Greece
and turning a blind eye when the country sharply cut its taxes) and then on the
demand side, by indicating thatGreece’s publicdebtwasworth that of anyother Euro-
zone member state (which caused financial markets to rush for Greek bonds). The
notion that such irresponsible dealings would have to be erased through the pain
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and sufferingof ordinary citizens (who, as democratic voters, are nowheld responsible
for their governments’ disastrous choices) is deeply troubling and awarning sign that
Europe’s economic designs may benefit no one but the most powerful.
Finally, Marion Fourcade examines the cultural and political consequences of
the economic morality plays being acted in the corridors of Brussels andWashing-
ton. She reminds us that debt, whether contracted interpersonally or at the collect-
ive level between formally equal parties, is always a relationship of power, which
establishes hierarchies in material resources and moral character. When one
party struggles to fulfill its obligations, moral regulation intensifies. She argues
that Eurozone troubles are not only contributing to a rapid divergence
in economic trajectories between North and South, they are also awakening old
civilizational complexes, the cruelty of cultural stigma (as applied to entire popula-
tions) and the ghost of Europe’s violent past.
All too often, policy-makers and intellectuals delude themselves into believing
that moral judgments can be safely separated from ‘objective’ benchmarks of eco-
nomic action; all too often, we take as given the idea that profitmust bemaximized
(Beckert, 2006), or that debt must be repaid (Graeber 2011; Streeck, 2013). We fail
to recognize that these injunctions, like all economic processes and actions, are
the outcome of contingent human struggles. We must recover our ability to see
morality at work in economic processes, in other words to better understand the
moral and symbolic work that economic instruments and tools perform, and, con-
versely, the economic work that moral categorizations do. The political fights that
have accompanied blame attributions and punishments (or lack thereof) for the
crisis, the seemingly irreversible race for economic virtue among governments,
the soul-searching of institutions, such as the IMF, caught in their own contradic-
tions and self-doubts are powerful reminders that economic sociology andpolitical
economy have a lot to contribute to current economic debates. Showing the
political implications of some recent morality plays across a range of domains is
the ambition of the symposium, which brings together a roundtable discussion
held at theopeningof theMaxPlanckSciencesPoCenteronCopingwith Instability
in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.
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High wages in the financial crisis
Philippe Steiner*
Universite´ Paris–Sorbonne and Institut universitaire de France, Paris, France
*Correspondence: Philippe.Steiner@paris-sorbonne.fr
In this short piece, I will focus on the moral issue raised by the existence and per-
sistence of high levels of remuneration—which President Barak Obama in his
2010 State of the Union Address called ‘obscene’—during a period of financial
and economic crisis. I do not intend to go beyond a mere description of this
moral issue in the French context.1
The present crisis is not only a crisis in both ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ economies, it is
also a crisis in the moral dimension of prevailing economic opinion. This is
1This piece is based onmy last book, Les re´mune´rations obsce`nes (Steiner 2011). In that book I traced the
moral dimension from a systematic content analysis of Le Monde, a major French national newspaper,
and Sud-Ouest, a regional one. Here, I will limit myself to the first newspaper.
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particularly salientwith regard to the distributional effects of the financialization of
companies. Economic analysis argues that whatever happens in the production of
goods, the marginal contribution and the marginal remuneration of each
participant should be equal. People are paid according to their contribution to
production—nomatter whichway youmeasure the former,market forces are sup-
posed to match the two faces of the issue.2 Huge payments, the argument
goes, should not upset anybody, since they are just signaling the high level of
contribution made by the fortunate recipient to the production of wealth. If you
add to this credo the use of so-called incentive payments, very large compensations
are the fuel that is necessary for the realization of these high levels of contribution.
One may wonder whether economic science is a hard science, but nobody can cast
doubt upon its status as a hardmoral discoursewhen the distribution ofwealth is at
stake, as John Stuart Mill warned his readers by the middle of the nineteenth
century.
This was all wrecked by the financial crash in September 2008.
By mid-September 2008, French newspapers were telling their readers day after
day that at the top levelofmajorfirms—notably thosewhichbelong to theStandard
and Poor’s 500 or to its French equivalent, the so-called CAC 40—there was a com-
plete decoupling between performance and the size of remuneration packages
(wage + bonuses + stock options + perks); this was particularly the case in the
financial and banking sectors.
A sociologist interested in the sociology ofmarkets and itsmoral underpinnings
could then profit from the large amount of data offered by daily newspapers, in his
effort to understand the moral reaction that later emerged as social movements,
such as ‘Occupy Wall Street’ with its famous motto ‘We are the 99%’, or the
European-wide movement known as ‘Los indignados’.
What picture emerged from reading newspapers between September 2008 and
June 2010? It can be summarized by three words: disproportion, disconnection and
inequality.
Disproportionwhen George Pe´bereau, the former CEO of the Compagnie Ge´n-
e´rale d’Electricite´, commenting on the remuneration of managers such as Philippe
Jaffre´, Antoine Zacharias, Daniel Bernard and Jean-Noel Forgeard, said that ‘they
have provoked a feeling of revolt among white collar workers, who are incredulous
at the unbelievable remuneration earned by top managers’.3 Disproportion again
when a French trader living in London explained that ‘None of my mates in
Eˆcole Polytechnique, not even the one who is now the head of a big automobile
2There is a large literature on the contribution/remuneration dimension of managers’ activity since the
rise of financial capitalism: see, for example, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Murphy (1999), Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001), Gabaix and Landier (2008).
3Le Monde, September 17, 2008, p. 17.
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firm, could earn in a few years as much as I did: enough money to buy a flat in the
capital city and a house on the seafront’.4 Disproportion when a paper stated that
the CEO of Goldman Sachs earned 53 million dollars and that the total amount
of bonuses paid in the City was 21 billion dollars.5 More disproportion still when
Le Monde picked up from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that the six people
at of the head of the Porsche automobile firm had received 143 million euros,
half of that sum accruing to the CEO, an amount of money that the German news-
paper translated into the extravagant hourly rate of 21 346 euros, provided that this
economic superman worked 70 h a week, 52 weeks a year.6
Disconnection, when Le Mondementioned that Patricia Russo, CEO of Alcatel,
received a golden parachute worth 6 million euros, when over the previous 8
years the firmhad lost 95%of its share value.7 Disconnection againwhen the news-
paper told its readers that 40billionof the 700billiondollars of thePaulsonplanwill
be used to pay the bonuses of bankers.8 More disconnection still when the news-
paper publicized the claim made by the former CEO of a large business bank
buyout that he deserved a 10 million dollar bonus—13 times his annual remuner-
ation—because it was his prudent management during the recent crisis that had
succeeded in reducing losses for the owners.9
Inequalitywhen George Pe´bereau pointed out that wealth inequality was creat-
ing a revolutionary situation: ‘the discrepancy between wage earners and the small
minority of the privileged, sheltered by political powers, is deepening to the point
that the situation is now similar to the revolutionary situation in 1789’.10 Inequality
again when a journalist pointed out: ‘Whereas the wages of 90% of the population
have increased slowly (4%) during the last eight years, themeanwage of the top 1%
has benefitted from a 14% increase’.11
The situation was thus socially constructed in terms of moral outrage. Suddenly,
economic phenomena that had been either taken for granted, or simply neglected,
aroused the contempt of journalists and the middle classes. New justifications had
to be devised in order to answer those whowere infuriated by the decoupling of per-
formances and remuneration, and who claimed that a more equal distribution of
4Ibid., September 21–22, 2008, p. 10.
5Ibid., October 19–20, 2008, p. 9.
6Ibid., December 1, 2008, p. 12.
7Ibid., September 3, 2008, p. 17.
8Ibid., November 6, 2008, p. 19.
9Ibid., December 10, 2008, p. 16.
10Ibid., September 17, 2008, p. 17.
11Ibid., October 25, 2008, p. 2.
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earnings should be established. Market justifications provided by economists or
those receiving those obscene levels of remuneration faced a moral outcry, together
with moral claims from those suffering from the economic misbehavior of those in
receipt of substantial bonuses. As E´mileDurkheimwrote one century ago, the ‘lawof
supply and demand’ no longer brought into alignment the moral evaluation of the
services provided and the remuneration received; and whatever economists might
think about it, ‘laypeople felt that it was unfair’ (Durkheim, 1976, p. 226). The situ-
ationwas thus typical ofwhatmaybecalledamoral economy,where economicactions
and institutions are evaluated according to a moral point of view different from the
one explicitly or implicitly embedded in the prevailing economic discourse.
How is this moral economy structured? A brief comparison between two
surveys, an older European (ISSP, 1999) one, and a French one from 2 years ago,
makes salient four characteristics—see Table 1.
First, the structure of incomedistribution remains largely unknown to the public.
A majority of the people queried believes that this distribution has the shape of a
pyramid (a large number of poor forming the base, with a few wealthy people in
the upper reaches), when the distribution has in fact the shape of a lozenge.
Second, in all countries, inequalities are considered by the public to be too great,
less so in the USA (with 66% of the respondents agreeing with this statement), and
more so in Europe (respectively, 82, 86 and 89% respectively in Great Britain,
France and Spain).
Third, while wages and the hierarchy of wages are well-known at the bottom of
the pyramid of the distribution, the remuneration received at the top is grossly
underestimated. In 1999, respondents underestimated the ratio between the
wageof aworker and the remunerationof aCEObya factor 10; theunderestimation
was still of a factor of 5 in 2010.
Fourth, respondentswerenot egalitarian, since they limited theirdesired ratio to
a reduction of estimated inequalities by a factor 2 (this factor is somewhat larger in
France: 3 in 1999 and 3.5 in 2010 as shown in Table 1). Respondents were not stub-
bornly attached to their previous views on the issue, since French data show how
dramatic was the change in the desired ratio, which jumped upward and increased
Table 1 CEO revenues to unskilled worker revenues ratio
Germany USA Great Britain France 1999 France 2010
Perceived ratio 8 12.5 12.5 16 63
Desired ratio 5 5 5.6 6.3 18
Source: Data from International Social Survey Programme (1999) and GEMASS Survey (2010). See also Forse´ and
Galland (2011, p. 268).
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the income of a CEO from 6.3 times the unskilled worker’s wages to 18 times—
about 22 000 euros a month, according to the current minimum wage in France.
These characteristic features of themoral economy, engendered by the existence
and persistence of obscene remunerations rewarding failure and cupidity, prompt
some concluding comments.
First, inequality does matter, as Joseph Stiglitz (2012) wrote in his last book. It
matters because perceived inequality may have far-reaching consequences for the
functioning of a democratic society, notably when a large majority of the people
have the feeling that they cannot do anything to change the situation. The
present low level of confidence in political leaders is (in France—but is this
limited to France?) related to what Stiglitz calls the government ‘of the 1%, for
the 1%, by the 1%’ (Stiglitz, 2012, p. xi and chapter 9). In this sense, the rise of eco-
nomic inequality which introduces a major cleavage between those who belong to
the first percentile of the income distribution and the remainder of society (Piketty
and Saez, 2003; Piketty, 2005) can be considered a form of social pollution, down-
grading the quality of social life, in the same way that chemical pollution down-
grades the quality of the atmosphere or of the water.
Second, moral economy is both weak and powerful. Weak because, as it is often
said, morality is a soft power when confronted with hard economic or political
issues. Furthermore, the feeling of moral deprivation may lead to apathy rather
than to political strength, nationalistic and narrow-minded approaches rather
than innovative ones. Powerful, because, when connected to political forces,
moral issues may become a lever to foster political change. The European Parlia-
ment’s recent decision to cap bonuses in the financial industry is a recent and
clear example of this power.
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The morality of rescuing banks
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Trust in banks is at an all-time low. Inmost countries touched by the financial crisis,
trust in the financial industry experienced a significant drop from 2008 to 2012.
According to one recent survey, countries with traditionally high trust in banks,
such as the USA, saw confidence fall from 70 to 30%. In countries such as Ireland,
trust in banks reached a record low of 6% (Edelmann Trust Barometer, 2012).1
Moral judgments about the roleof banks in thefinancial crisis are close tounani-
mous. Banks are the culprits of the crisis, brought aboutbyexcessive risk-taking and
expansion for over a decade. The benefits of these risks constituted private gains.
When things turned sour, excessive risks should have been shouldered by those
who had benefited. In the worst case, financial institutions should go bank-
rupt—the ultimate price to pay for unsound strategic choices.
For themost part, this did not happen. Instead, governments everywhere rushed
to support their banking sectors, committing considerable amounts of public
money to ensure their stability. The categories used to describe these bank bailouts
are unambiguous: criticizing the privatization of profits and the socialization of
losses, Joseph Stiglitz has called the US bank bailout the ‘robbery of the American
people’ (Fenton andKan, 2009). Others have commented that ‘capitalismwithout fi-
nancial failure isnotcapitalismatall, butakindofsocialismfor the rich’ (Grant, 2007).
1TheEdelmanTrustBarometer is anon-representativeonline survey. For a representative surveyon trust
that covers only Europe, see the Eurobarometer surveys.
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One of the core concepts in economics describes why government intervention
to save the banking sector is a bad thing: it creates moral hazard. The normative
valence is signaled by the term itself. It encapsulates the idea that misplaced incen-
tives lead self-interested individuals to rely on others for their own benefit, to ‘free-
ride’ on public insurance.
Focusing on moral hazard has led many economists to criticize the bank rescue
schemes in very strong terms. In an unusual alliance, they are joined by those
opposed tomarket integration andfinancemoregenerally,whoalsovividly criticize
bank support as anundue gift to thebanking industry, another proof of thepolitical
power of a small fraction of the economy, which has risen to dominate both society
and politics. It is difficult not to agree with many of the accusations and hard
to understand how anybody could defend committing public money to save the
financial industry in times of crisis.
Indeed, thosemaking arguments in support of the bank bailouts do this without
any moral high-ground. They underline the fact that the financial industry has
become too connected and that the failure of one institution will risk damaging
others, in many cases so severely that the entire sector and possibly the economy
as a whole will suffer substantially. Rescuing banks is not done for their own sake
but to avoid a situation that would be even worse and more costly, where the gov-
ernment would have to step in to ensure that firms and employees in the so-called
real economy can continue having access to credit and working. Bailouts are thus
simply lesser evils, but by no means desirable or sustainable.
The difficulties that come with this weak moral standpoint were felt by politi-
cians everywhere. All governments in power at the outbreak of the banking crisis
have been voted out of office. Stabilizing the economy and following the moral
high ground appeared to have been in stark opposition. As the current US Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geither puts it: ‘Old Testament justice would have prevented us
fromputtingout thepanic, getting growthback,making people feelmore confident
in the future.’ As a result, he concludes ‘we saved the economy, butwe lost the public
doing it’ (cited in Swedberg, 2012, footnote 14). Inmanycountrieswherebankbail-
outs imposed considerable costson society, there is a senseof adeeplydysfunctional
system of political representation and elite dominance.
At the heart of the problem is a disconnect between moral categories, which
apply to individual banks, enshrined in the notion ofmoral hazard, and public jus-
tifications for bank rescues, which center on a collective problem: systemic risk.
Put differently, the identified moral problem—the behavior of individual
banks—and the cited justification for government action—the stability of the fi-
nancial sector—focus on different units of analysis and therefore inevitably
create a tension. Politically, this can only be resolved if the diagnosis of the stakes
and our moral categories are aligned. This means that we need to think about the
collective moral responsibilities of the financial industry.
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Many governments have attempted to impose such collective responsibilities on
the financial industry during the bailout discussions in the fall of 2008. In the
weekend negotiations over the fall of Lehman Brothers, the US government
assembled the CEOs of the major financial institutions and asked them to come
up with a private sector solution, insisting with reference to the support
given to Bear Stearns that ‘we have done the last one, you are doing this one
(Wessel 2010, 16).’ The German government repeatedly asked the heads of the
major banking associations and the principal financial institutions to put together
a collective support mechanism for struggling banks. In France, Denmark and
Austria, government and financial representatives worked toward a private sector
solution with public backing to ensure continued liquidity.
Inmost cases, however, the collective support schemes failed tomaterialize. One
leader of the American financial industry responded incredulously: ‘we are respon-
sible forourownbalance sheets, andnowweneed tobe responsible forothers?’ (cited
in Paulson, 2011, p. 198). The size of the aid neededwent far beyondwhat individual
bankswere able to support, given that they all had similardifficulties at the time. Even
in countries where the financial industry contributed collectively, such as France,
Denmark or Austria, the government needed to step in and complement this
action through guarantees and additionalmeasures.When collective action of the fi-
nancial industrydidnot comeabout, thegovernment stepped in topickup thebill. In
most cases, collective action from the financial industry failed, and this explains the
disproportionate part of the costs born by taxpayers. This failure of collective solu-
tions, however, is much less discussed than the incentive structures that had led to
risky behavior of individual banks prior to the crisis.
The implication of my diagnosis for the future of bank regulation and support
schemes is that we needmore, rather than less, political involvement of the financial
industry. This is a rather surprising conclusion, since a chorus of critics have warned
that financehasunduepolitical influence. I argue thatfinancial institutionshaveheld
many strong individual ties with their governments, but insufficient ties with each
other in most countries. In his latest book, American sociologist Mark Mizruchi
(2013) analyzes this from a network perspective for the US corporate elite more
generally in his latest book. Showing how corporate leaders have succeeded in
pushing back constraints imposed by labor and government, while simultaneously
being exposed to an ever more short-termist shareholder capitalism, Mizruchi
argues that the American business elite today is fragmented and no longer seeks to
contribute to social and political issues as they have in the past. Accelerated by the
decline of commercial banks, whose boardrooms served as meeting places for the
American company networks, business elites have abandoned long-term political
initiatives and now concentrate on the short-term interests of their own firms.
Duringthecrisismanagement in2008, thegreatmajorityoffinancial elitesdefended
a similar position: unwilling or unable to engage in industry-wide commitments, they
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insisted on their firms’ interests only. Given the structural dependence public author-
ities have on finance, this inactionwas an invisible way of exerting power (Woll, forth-
coming). Incaseswhere thepolitical authority faces systemicrisks, thewinningstrategy
for the financial industry could be called: ‘staying divided to conquer’.2
Analyzing inaction in terms of power, as I have done here, is in itself a political
exercise. It implies that a viable alternative existed or should have been probed
(Guzzini, 2005). In doing so, I try to outline what moral debate has not yet taken
place, because the political space was occupied with moral hazard considerations
and the reprimanding of public authorities accused of being captured by the finan-
cial industry. It leaves in the dark the collective responsibilities of the industries in
the moment of crisis.
Financial regulation to prevent a future crisis should not only concentrate on
moral hazard issues and the incentive structures for individual institutions,
which is very usefully done through discussion about bail-in mechanisms and
the nature of resolution regimes for failing banks. It also needs to acknowledge
the systemic nature of collective interdependence and build privately financed
mechanisms to respond to a downturn collectively. A bank levy funding a collective
insurance scheme isoneway forwardandneeds tobecomplementedbymutual sur-
veillance mechanisms between financial institutions that curb free-riding.
During the last 20years, all of thenearly100bankingcrises thathaveoccurred inter-
nationallywereresolvedthroughbailouts at the taxpayer’s expense.Rather thansimply
declaring bailouts as the moral failure of banks and later politicians, we should draw
the lessons from these experiences and work toward public arrangements that con-
strain financial institutions to contribute to their own rescue. This can only be done
prior to a crisis and implies that we translate the benefits they reap from interdepend-
ence intopublic obligations toprotect against systemrisk.Weneed tobuild regulatory
arrangements that engage thefinancial industry as a collective,where their enlightened
self-interest can direct them toward maintaining the stability of the economy.
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The construction of a moral duty for the Greek
people to repay their national debt†
Wolfgang Streeck*
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Debtmust be repaid in full, as amoral principle in everyday life. I owemyneighbor
who has helped me out not to let him down. Today public discourse in Europe
applies the duty to repay to entire nations, conceived as moral communities:
‘Greece’must repay ‘its’ debt, even though most Greeks have never seen an invest-
ment bank from the inside.
The reason why Greek citizens are supposed to be responsible for the debt in-
curredby their governments and their central bank is that their country is, allegedly,
a democracy. ‘No taxation without representation’ is reinterpreted to mean: ‘With
representation, full liability’. Greek citizens are made liable regardless of whether
they have voted for the governments that have indebted them, or whether they
have voted at all or whether they have ever benefited from the debt. Such is the
magic of representative democracy.
Remarkably, selecting theGreek citizens who are to bemade to pay for ‘Greece’s’
collective debt is left to a government runby the very sameparties that have piledup
†Dedicated to EmileDurkheim, the sociologist, whohas taught us the difference between just andunjust
contracts, and toDavidGraeber, the anarchist, for remindingus of the socialmeaning of credit and debt.
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the debt in the first place.1 Given the size of the debt, the ministers and central
bankers that have incurred it cannot possibly repay it personally, comfortable as
their salaries, savings and inherited wealth may be.2 To the extent that they still
hold public office, they have the privilege to declare repayment the moral duty of
the pensioners, the patients, the civil servants and the workers of Greece, who are
called upon to help out their country by helping out its creditors.3
However, neither the capital market nor international politics are a traditional
Chinese family, with its unquestionable moral duty for a nephew to repay a loan
from his uncle in full, at whatever cost. The morality of a financial market, just as
that of international relations, is based ondifference, not on identity, and it is there-
fore regulated by law rather than paternal authority.
In commercial life, a debtor who has become insolvent may initiate legal pro-
ceedings to have his debt ‘restructured’, or even canceled. Liability is often limited
to capital invested, protecting private wealth. Creditors are expected to make them-
selves knowledgeable about the risk of a debtor being unable to service his debt, and
adjust the rate of interest they demand accordingly (i.e. ask for an adequate ‘risk
premium’ under the principle of caveat emptor). It is said that, in the USA, having
gone bankrupt once or twice is nothing to be ashamed of as it indicates a spirit of
daring entrepreneurship.
In most civil law systems, there is a limit to the seizure of property or income to
repay outstanding debt, ensuring that private bankruptcy does not result in abject
poverty. In Germany, for example, citizens who go bankrupt are allowed to keep
roughly 2000 euros amonth of their income, to enable them to fulfill family obliga-
tions and continue to participate in social life. Courts cannot impound a person’s
television set, anddebtorsmust remain able to pay for health care and even set aside
savings for their old age.
1From 1989 on, the two major political parties, Nea Demokratia and PASOK, have taken turns in the
Greek prime minister’s office. The present prime minister, Antonis Samaras (in office since June,
2012), is the leader of Nea Demokratia and governs in a grand coalition with PASOK. In 1989 he was
Minister of Finance; in the 1990s he served as Minister for Foreign Affairs.
2Not tomention their kleptocraticwealth. SeeTheNewYorkTimes, January 5, 2013, on the formerGreek
finance minister, Papaconstantinou, and his family, among them a cousin who runs, of all things, the
country’s privatization agency.
3And help they did. Gross household disposable income declined on average by 13% from 2008 to 2011,
in which year 30% of the population of Greece were at risk of poverty (Directorate-General for
Employment, 2012). Unemployment, meanwhile, approached 30% by the end of 2012, and 50% for
young people. By June 2012, salaries in the private and public sectors had been cut by up to 50%, and
under a deal with the ‘Troika’, 150 000 public sector jobs were to be eliminated within a year’s time.
On the catastrophic condition of the Greek health care system after years of Troika governance, see
The New York Times, December 26, 2011, ‘Fiscal Crisis Takes Toll on Greeks’, http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/27/world/europe/greeks-reeling-from-health-care-cutbacks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Moreover, purveyors of credit are legally obliged to provide customers with
truthful information about the nature of the loans offered by them, in particular
their true cost. Creditors who have not been properly advised can sue for
damages. There may even be criminal penalties for withholding important infor-
mation from customers. (Did Greek politicians and central bankers fully inform
their fellow citizens on the risks associated with the cheap credit they started
taking up in their name upon entry into the Monetary Union?)
Furthermore, under international law, sovereign countries can unilaterally
cancel their debt or apply a ‘haircut’ to their creditors at their discretion. The
ability to default at will is an essential element of national sovereignty, and of
course providers of credit to governments know this. Behind it is the principle
that countries are obligated first to their citizens and only then to other countries
or to international organizations and the ‘financial markets’. The moral language
of the European financial crisis today is designed to repress thememory of this fun-
damental condition, so that the ‘financial industry’ and the governments of lender
countries can be safe. Banks and economically leading nation-states are together
framing the crisis in a way that makes it the moral duty of a state to apply a
haircut, should one become necessary, to its citizens rather than its creditors.
Astonishingly, thismoral construction is hardly everquestioned, although an al-
ternative story would seem to be readily available. Its starting point would be the
co-responsibility of the creditor for the failure of the debtor: the obligation not
to make loans to borrowers who will most likely not be able to repay them. In
the USA, this obligation is at the center of a vast number of cases making their
way through the courts against reckless providers of subprime mortgages.
Similar principles may be invoked if a barman keeps serving double whiskies to a
customer who is already drunk, and then lets him drive home in his car.
The official versionof theGreeknational debtmorality playmust be all themore
welcome to Greece’s creditors given the history of Greek indebtedness, a history
that is much more complex and includes many more villains than the current
‘repay thy neighbor’ rhetoric suggests:
(1) Before the advent of the euro, Greece, like Spain and Portugal, received consid-
erable amounts of cash every year fromtheEuropeanUnion, allegedly tohelp the
country ‘develop’.4 It isquestionable,however, towhatextentEuropeanaidinfact
served that purpose and indeed whether anyone cared about it. What it
undoubtedly did was to stabilize the western European orientation of Greek
political elites, rewarding them for rejectingbothmilitarydictatorshipandEuro-
communism in the 1970s and 1980s. The ‘clientelism’ of the two main Greek
4Between 1995 and 1998, Greece received yearly subsidies from the European Union that amounted
to roughly 4% of its gross domestic product.
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political parties in the last twodecadesof the twentieth centurywas to an import-
ant extent funded by European regional and structural development funds.
(2) Cash transfers to Greece (and to Spain and Portugal as well) were frozen in the
late 1990s, in the course of efforts in the rich countries to consolidate their
public finances, as well as in response to the need to extend financial assistance
to eastern Europe after the end of communism. Admission to the Monetary
Union had the welcome side effect that it enabled Mediterranean countries
to borrow money in international financial markets at roughly western Euro-
pean rates, replacing transfers from national treasuries with credit from inter-
national banks. In effect, this was the international equivalent of the ‘privatized
Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2009) of the time in the domestic political economies
of countries like the USA and the UK.
(3) TheEuropeanUnionwas acutely awareof the need to giveGreece and the other
Mediterranean countries access to cheap credit in lieu of fiscal transfers.
As Monetary Union started, the Commission—in the person of the Commis-
sioner in charge of financial services, Mario Monti—ruled that public debt
from member states could indistinctly be used by banks as collateral for loan
transactions (Gabor and Ban, 2012). This caused a run on state papers and
led to rapid convergence of risk premiums among EMU countries. It
enabled Greece in particular to indebt itself at a previously unknown pace,
without its interest payments skyrocketing (Figure 15).
(4) The need for Greece to take up credit resulted not least from its truly byzantine
tax regime. The media like to point to widespread tax evasion among the
working and middle classes, which fits in with the rhetoric holding them
morally responsible for paying off the national debt on behalf of Greece as a
whole. It is remarkable, however, that the European Union never tried to
make Greece rescind the constitutional tax privileges of the Orthodox
Church6 or of Greek shipowners.7 Nor did the European Commission object
5The two vertical bars indicate the years of Greece’s entry in EMU and the onset of the Great Recession,
respectively. The right-hand axis measures government debt in percent of GDP; all other variables are
measured by the left-hand axis.
6See The GuardianWeekly, October 4, 2011: ‘The Greek church and its monasteries will not have to pay
the deeply unpopular property tax that the government introduced in September in an effort to fulfill
Greece’s austerity targets. “The church will be taxed on any assets used for business purposes,” a
finance ministry spokesman said after news of the tax caused an outcry. Places of worship and
charitable organizations will be exempt from the tax. But the borderline is fuzzy and the accounts of
the Orthodox church are opaque . . . ’. For details see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/
04/greece-orthodox-church-economic-crisis.
7See Ekathimerini, June 12, 2012: ‘Greek ship owners who remitted more than $175 billion in untaxed
earnings to the country in 10 years say theywould relocate the businesses if a new government scraps the
fiscal exemption, risking asmany as 60,000 jobs. The country’s estimated 762 vessel owners pay no taxon
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when Greece, immediately upon its admission to EMU, cut the top rate of its
corporate tax from 40 to 20% (Markantonatu, 2012), replacing revenue fore-
gonewith cheap credit.8 Tax competition is deeplywritten into the fabric of the
SingleMarket and theEuropeanUnion generally; it is considered economically
healthy especially for the higher taxation countries in the North and West
whose tax regimes are in this way put under pressure.
(5) In order forGreece to formallymeet the criteria of admission to EMU, it had to
engage in creative accounting, for which it needed the assistance of that
Figure 1 Greece: Monetary Union and public finance.
Source: EU-Haushalt Finanzberichte,OECDNationalAccounts,OECDEconomicOutlookDatabase.
international earnings brought into Greece under rules incorporated in the country’s constitution since
1967. The SYRIZAparty, which opposesGreece’s international bailout and is shown by polls as vying for
first place before a June 17 election, says it wants to abolish the tax break.’ http://www.ekathimerini
.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_12/06/2012_446527. The 1967 constitution was imposed by the
military dictatorship. In 1972 the dictator, General Papadopoulos, was made Lifetime Honorary
President of the Greek Ship-owners Association (Markantonatu, 2012).
8Both transfers from EU structural funds and low-interest loans after Monetary Union may reasonably
bedescribed as subsidies bywesternEuropean countries for anoligarchic tax regime in an effort to secure
social peace on their Mediterranean glacis, by sparing a country like Greece from the need to
revolutionize an archaic social structure.
618 Discussion forum
 
bank-of-all-banks, Goldman Sachs. It is now known that Goldman made an
extraordinary profit on that operation.9 It is not yet known enough, however,
that the president of the Greek central bank at this time was one Lukas Papade-
mos, who a few years later advanced to the position of vice president of the ECB,
and fromthere to that of theprimeministerofGreece, appointedby internation-
al capitalmarkets to secure therepaymentofGreek’sdebt to its creditors.Nor is it
sufficiently known that when Greece’s entry in EMUwas made possible, Mario
Draghi was waiting in the wings to become the European chief of Goldman
Sachs. Thereafter, in rapid succession, he became the governor of the Banca
d’Italia—which includes membership in the governing body of the ECB—and
then the president of the ECB. It is completely inconceivable that Papademos
and Draghi and their ilk should not have been aware of the way in which the
Greek government of the time made use of their country’s membership in
EMU to replace both domestic taxes and international fiscal subsidies with
cheap credit from, among others, Goldman Sachs.
(6) Another aspect of the Greek tragedy is the fact that rampant capital flight from
Greece remained and remains entirely unchecked at both the national and the
European level. Newspapers have again and again written about the vast
amounts of Greek money that are flowing into the real estate markets of cities
such as London,10 Paris and Berlin, greatly benefiting local owners of luxury
houses and apartments. This is another result of the lifting of capital controls in
the 1990s and thereafter, which was part and parcel of the Internal Market and,
in particular, Monetary Union. Never has the European Union or its leading
member states suggested to the Greek government that it limit transactions of
this sort, nor have they suggested that member governments tax Greek real
estate investment abroad as an act of ‘European solidarity’ (Gro¨zinger, 2012).
9See Bloomberg, March 6, 2012, ‘Goldman Secret Greece Loan Shows Two Sinners as Client Unravels’.
The article begins as follows: ‘Greece’s secret loan from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) was a costly
mistake from the start. On the day the 2001 deal was struck, the government owed the bank about
600 million euros ($793 million) more than the 2.8 billion euros it borrowed, said Spyros
Papanikolaou, who took over the country’s debt-management agency in 2005. By then, the price of
the transaction, a derivative that disguised the loan and that Goldman Sachs persuaded Greece not to
test with competitors, had almost doubled to 5.1 billion euros . . . ’.
10See The Guardian, April 13, 2010: ‘Greeks taking fright at the fiscal crisis [ . . . ] are snapping up
properties in Britain as part of a desperate flight of capital. [ . . . ] Prime real estate in London, the
traditional home of Greece’s wealthy shipping community, is being bought at an unprecedented rate
by rich Greeks desperate to transfer their bank deposits. The land grab has astounded estate agents,
with many referring to the new homebuyers as “cash Greeks” because of their willingness to part with
large sums of money in record time to secure £1m-plus properties. “They are all cash buyers, serious
players who are only interested in the high-end market around Regent’s Park, Mayfair and
Marylebone,” said Panos Koutsoyiannakis at the central London estate agents Fraser & Co.’ http://
www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/13/greek-debt-crisis-capital-outflow.
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Themoral discourse onGreekpublic finances focuses on ‘theGreek citizens’ and
their presumedduty to payoff debt takenupby their past governments, supposedly
to enable their voters to enjoy an easy life on unearned income. It aims primarily at
pensioners andworkers, in both the private and the public sectors, and functions as
a deplorably successful ideological tool wielded by the ‘market forces’ and
their bureaucratic-political running dogs, in Greece as well as in Brussels and
Washington. The aim is to suck the Greek people dry and strip them of everything
theymay have gained for themselves in three decades of democracy. I am convinced
that the storydoes not endhere and thatGreece is nomore thana testing ground for
the same treatment to be applied to other European countries. The personnel to
perform the sucking are already in place while the instruments are being continu-
ously refined in the Greek operating theater.
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The economy is always and everywhere the theater of a morality play, where moral
worth is being negotiated alongside economic worth. People interpret differential
rewards in the economy both as a ‘functional requirement’ and as a ‘normative
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imperative’ flowing fromequity considerations: thosewhoput inmorework should
be better compensated (Sachweh, 2012). Even when routinely contradicted by the
reality of social inequalities, thismoral belief is so strong that those who find them-
selves at the bottom of the economic scale, or in a situation of financial distress, are
often suspected of low effort, innatemediocrity ormoral weakness. Always inwant
of money, but never trusted with it, the poor in particular are the object of enor-
mous suspicion, which seems to justify special controls and obligations.1 Moral
hierarchies are brought into alignment with economic hierarchies through the fre-
quent and ordinary ‘shaming of those who fail’ (Sayer, 2005, p. 959): big and small
acts of contempt, obliviousness, condescension, disrespect and coercion waged in
everyday life as well as through the operation of institutions that deploy consider-
able resources and ingenuity to tell the ‘deserving’ apart from the ‘undeserving’.2
Conversely, the position of the economically powerful is, at least partly, natura-
lizedas theoutcomeofmerit, talentormoral strength.Further symbolicqualification
may come in the formof self-confidence, bodily appearance and hexis, linguistic and
social skills, andcultural capital. Embodieddispositionsandattributesoperate as im-
plicit resources that anchor social hierarchies andmake themmore legitimate—not
only in the eyes of the dominant, but in those of the dominated as well. This is, quite
simply, what Pierre Bourdieu (1984) called symbolic violence. To be sure, rich indi-
vidualsmay elicit animosity and contempt, too, particularly when they are perceived
as haughty anddistant (e.g. see Prasad et al., 2009), or abusing their power, or having
inherited—rather than earned—their wealth (Beckert, 2008). But the asymmetry
remains: the social psychology literature has documented, time and again, that
even young children learn early on to make much more positive attributions about
the ‘moral character’ of the rich versus the poor (Skafte, 1989).
Hierarchy and debt
Economic transactions and interactions are a powerful vehicle for the crystalliza-
tion of moral categories precisely because they are a key mechanism through
which individuals and human collectives obtain or are recognized positions in
the social structure. But nowhere is the entanglement between social position, eco-
nomic worth and moral worth more obvious than in the case of debt, where the
1Piven and Cloward (1971), for instance, have described the insidious surveillance strategies developed
by welfare officials to make sure recipients of public assistance programs really deserved help.
2Much research suggests that the cultural boundary between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ is
strengthened through racial or ethnic stigmatization. Thus the weakness of solidaristic feelings and
institutions in the USA has often been related to the country’s brutal racial history, which has resulted
in the seemingly intractable situation of a large black underclass (Quadagno, 1996; Gilens 1999;
Lamont, 2000). In Europe, weakening support for the welfare state has also been understood as a
byproduct of negative attitudes toward immigrants (Senik et al., 2009; Eger, 2010).
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D
economic standing and character of borrowers are simultaneously constituted as
the precondition of the economic relationship and as its essential stake. Thus
MaxWeber (1978) saw the distinction between debtors and creditors as a primor-
dial principle of social differentiation and a point of origin for the constitution of
‘economic classes’: that distinction structured society into groups with unequal
economic trajectories. But it also differentiated between people of unequal moral
worth. To be sure, lendingwas always amorally suspicious business, and it was stig-
matized accordingly throughout history. In a fully developed credit economy,
where lenders are large and impersonal, however, themoral burden of the relation-
ship falls disproportionately on the shoulders of the borrower. As David Graeber
(2010, 120) puts it,
During the time that the debt remains unpaid, the logicof hierarchy takes
hold. . . . But always there is the assumption that the situation is some-
what unnatural, because the debt really ought to be paid. This is what
makes situations of effectively unpayable debt so difficult and painful.
Since creditor and debtor are ultimately equals, if the debtor cannot do
what it takes to restore herself to equality, there is obviously something
wrong with her.
And thus a bad debtor will be punished through the very instruments of her
sin: having lost her ‘credit’, she will find that money is more expensive now, or
more difficult to obtain altogether.
Just like there is an economic andmoral ordering among people, there is an eco-
nomic and moral ordering among nation-states. Debt stands at the core of it, too.
Insisting that money is owed—in the form of tributes, reparations and the fulfill-
ment of contractual obligations—is how political entities have historically asserted
their superiority against vulnerable others, be theydefeated enemies, rebellious col-
onies, or simply weaker economic partners.
Tough love
Since the widespread institutionalization of sovereign (government) debt in the
1800s, the economic position of political entities known as states is translated
through the conditions this debt faces on international financial markets. The
price of a country’s sovereign debt (the interest rates its bonds command on
these markets) appears as an objectified measure of some sort of underlying
moralworth in the eyesof investors, encapsulating the country’s ability andwilling-
ness to repay. Because these evaluations are both hard to pin down and highly
speculative, however, variations in the terms of credit faced by states may be ex-
tremely brutal, driven by rapid swings in collective sentiment as much as by
changes in fundamentals (see, for instance, the 2009 un-hinging of interest rates
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on Greek debt inWolfgang Streeck’s article in this symposium). Thus nations may
find themselves in the situation of being all but priced out of private financing (in
other words, the risk premium is so high that they cannot borrow anymore). This is
when the institutions of last resort intervene, the InternationalMonetary Fundfirst
among them; with the crisis in the Eurozone, the European Union and the Euro-
pean Central Bank have also stepped in. But with such interventions the nature
of the moral regulation changes. Instead of the mechanical disciplining of the
market (in the form of country credit ratings, the up and down movements of
the interest rate on sovereign debt bonds and the price of insurance for these
bonds—or sovereign credit default swaps), an alternative arsenal may now be
rolled out in exchange for affordable credit, with conditionality and surveillance
at its core. As The Guardian recently phrased it, ‘you could think of the IMF as a
global payday loan company for countries who have got into trouble and can’t
meet their financial commitments – the difference being that instead of charging
sky-high interest rates, it demands radical economic reforms’ (Aitkenhead, 2012).
The analogy between individuals and nations is tricky, however. First, countries
technically have the capacity to tax their population, so government debt, unlike in-
dividual debt, is supposedly much less risky. [This, however, is mitigated by the fact
that countries default on their debt all the time, and have been doing so for over two
centuries (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).] Second, the rating process is opaque,
shrouded in mystery and behind-the-scenes politics: against the mechanical object-
ivity of technologies of individual credit (especially scoring), country ratings come
in the form of much less precise categorical statements—letter grades rather than
numerical scores. Third, it ismaterially straightforward to hold individuals account-
able for debts they have contracted. But the moral responsibility of a country’s polit-
ical leaders, let alone its banks, is not easily fungible into themoral responsibilityof its
citizenry. So the lenders of last resort are faced with a moral dilemma: politicizing
blame (by targeting governments or private entities) or nationalizing it (by encom-
passing national communities). Often, the line between the two is very hard to tread.
The conditional ‘helping hand’ of the IMF interacts with political entities with a
mix of coercion and training [‘tough love’ in the words of Christine Lagarde, the
current head of the institution]. As such it is a deeply corrective mechanism,
with inescapable moral effects. Aimed at governments, programs have an unmis-
takable civilizational purpose—conditionality is a cultural, inherently modernist,
project to train, educate and profoundly reform those societies whose poor per-
formance has exposed as inadequate, insufficient, incompetent and shackled by
outdated institutions inimical to the flourishing ofmodern capitalism. Experts, in-
cluding from our own ranks, have their own vocabulary to designate the typical
flaws: rampant ‘corruption’, low ‘state capacity’, poor ‘governance’, ‘rigidities’ of
all sorts and ‘inefficient’ policies. The more troubled the country, the longer the
road to travel, and the tougher the conditions: in part this is because conditionality
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is the translation, in economic terms, of a perceived civilizational distance aswell as,
certainly, of a real power distance.
There is no escaping the collective nature of this form of discipline. A country’s
fall out of favor on international markets is a profoundly meaningful event in its
citizens’ lives. And this is not simply because nearly everyone’s material situation
is affected by its ramifications. To be sure, people are being economically down-
graded: if the currency is devalued standards of living will sink instantly; even in
the absence of a devaluation, the lost margin of maneuver in the face of high bor-
rowing costs and the stringent demands of the ‘helping hands’ on the fiscal
front will force many states into austerity, as has been the case in Portugal,
Ireland, Greece and Spain. Thus the intermediary classes in southern Europe,
which were the big beneficiaries of the short-lived moment of economic conver-
gence, cosmopolitanism and Euro-optimism before 2008, have suddenly found
themselves thrown back in time—not only to bleaker economic perspectives, but
also back to the confines of their nationality and its supposed backwardness.
Spoiled identities
But there are other consequences. As the perspective of convergence across Euro-
zone economies recedes on both the financial and the real economy fronts,3 it
has been replaced by the notion of an unbridgeable cultural gap between the
North and the South, which is skillfully exploited by Euroskeptics of all stripes.
So the economically vulnerable also face a form of moral downgrading, which
may takedifferent forms. First, through the fusion andconfusionof economicmor-
alities between the individual and collective levels, the average citizen of the for-
saken countries is emblematically represented, in the critics’ discourse, as a fool;
a tax evader; an imprudent borrower; or a freeloader enabled by a much too
lavish state. The moral violence of such symbolic markers leaves no one undis-
turbed, and thus stigmatized citizens will emphatically deny them; resent them;
and sometimes own up to them in an anxious search for absolution.
Second, the crisis-ridden countries of the Eurozone have found themselves
lumped collectively into one general flawed category. This moral sinkhole
absorbs and blends them together,4 in spite of the fact that they may have very dif-
ferent crisis etiologies. Southern European countries, for instance, were nicknamed
PIGS (for Portugal, Italy, Greece Spain) in the UK press in 2007. (They were the
‘club med’ countries before that.) In 2008 the epithet was made more shrill-
sounding with the addition of another I for Ireland—PIIGS. This amalgamation
may, in some cases, relieve themoral burdenof individual countries bymutualizing
3See, e.g., Atkins (2012).
4See Eyal (2010) for the concept of ‘moral blender’.
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it: thus a citizen from Greece might find some comfort in thinking ‘we’re not the
only ones’. But this kind of commonality is not necessarily reciprocated, or
valued across the board, so solidarity has not really emerged within southern
Europe. Mostly, the moral sinkhole has fueled centrifugal tendencies as people
and governments have been striving to distance themselves from those in countries
not (really) like them. Spain’s desperate efforts to avoid a European stability mech-
anism/IMF program is all about avoiding the stigma of being lumped together
in the same category as Greece.
Third, unlike themanynations, such asArgentina, that have been externally dis-
ciplined in the past, the Eurozone morality play has been performed by democrat-
ically elected governmentswith the backing, if not the active encouragement, of a large
segment of their populations. Individuals and politicians in themorally downgraded
countries have to see themselves through the looking glass of a collective,
pan-European (by and large a pan-northern European) stigma of incapacity and
illegitimacy—not through the esoteric pronouncements of a remote and widely
unpopular institution (the IMF). This is real, intersubjective stigma elevated to
the international stage. Their identity spoiled, contrite elites and populations are
expected to ‘manage’ it properly, which in the sociology of Erving Goffman
(1963) essentially means that they have to quietly ‘accept’ the implicitly inferior
status ascribed to them.
Moral struggles
In the Portuguese and Irish cases, a silent form of heroic self-constraint has indeed
prevailed, where each country has voluntarily engaged in a desperate, and very
costly, race for economic virtue (so far: opposition to this strategy is mounting
fast at the time of this writing, particularly in Portugal).5 In the Greek case,
however, the process has been much more brutal, externally driven and infantiliz-
ing, perhaps because the moral violation (the cooked national books, the tax
evasion) was perceived to be more egregious in the first place. As a result, the
divides between the nation and its outside, between the complying government
and the defiant population, between the taxed and the untaxed, between public
and private employees have been thrown into sharp relief, with each side projecting
the moral responsibility for the fiscal mess onto the other. And thus rebellion and
civic strife have set in.6
5The samepainfulprocesses evenextendoutside theEurozone, for instance, inwould-bememberLatvia,
deeply anxious to avoid falling back into theRussian orbit, and eager to demonstrate its Europeanmoral
worthiness by tightening its belt.
6Italy, likewise, wasmostly defiant—and barely governable—with populistmovements riding on awave
of anti-German sentiment.
Moral categories in the financial crisis 625
As the recent creation of an anti-Euro party in Germany attests, the dominant
countries are not left untouched by these centrifugal forces: they, too, split over
the possibility of greater pan-European solidarity, all the more since they are the
main targets of public resentment by those populations on the losing side of the
Eurozone. Perhaps the question ofwhether the cures proposed are economically ef-
fective or normatively justifiable is beyond the reach of this short piece. But point-
ing out the political importance of themoral–economicmechanics at work is not.
These exhausting struggles provoke and nourish deep emotions, fuel nationalistic
feelings andheightenboundarieswith the outside, especiallywhere foreign advisers
and managers step in. These sentiments are hardened by the preexisting nature of
national or regional bonds, and they revive long, andugly, histories of international
relations. These revivals have already brought about reverse moral struggles, from
Greece toward Germany in particular, over debts long forgiven and moral obliga-
tions inherited from a time Europe had worked so hard to burry and forget.
The energy generated by these emotions and the social devastation that has ac-
companied the crisismanagement process so far have also driven attempts to assert
or reclaim the highmoral ground—through politics, mainly, of amore peaceful or
more violent sort. These attempts include the rise of xenophobia, centrifugal forces
brewing in Spain and Belgium and strong resistance to expanding the European
federalist project into fiscal territory. The possible implosion of some states
under the pressure of economic austerity raises the specter of a Europe of the
pick-and-choosers, just the opposite of the great hopes that had nourished
the European project at its birth. And the sacrifice of large and young fractions of
the population on the altar of the moral responsibility to repay a debt most of
them did not contract tragically feeds into a political radicalization that may es-
trange them further from the targets of their resentment.
These moral struggles and the different paths they inspire are not a distraction
from some ‘real’ economic issues beneath. They stand at the economy’s core and at
the heart of the Eurozone’s future—and, with it, the future of Europe.
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